The Government of Bangladesh, recognizing the crucial role access to justice plays in combating pervasive violence against women and children, enacted the Anti-Women and Child Oppression Act in 2000. The Act establishes special tribunals with exclusive jurisdiction over all cases brought under it in each of Bangladesh’s sixty-four districts. The punishments are formidable, including life imprisonment for rape or attack with a corrosive substance. All of the offences are considered crimes against the State, meaning that the victim is legally barred from dropping charges in exchange for a settlement.
In practice, about 90% of the cases end in compromise. To circumvent the legal ban, the victim may agree to testify that no incident occurred, leaving the prosecutor almost completely void of credible evidence against the accused. Further, the financial resources and human capital the State commits to these cases detract from other cases where there is a greater chance of conviction. The Bangladesh legal community is divided on why compromises occur, but tends to strongly believe that either a) the victims harass the accused or b) the accused pressure the victims.
Empirical research conducted for this paper has focused on how the ban on compromise manifests in the tribunals, concentrating on the reasons for compromises and the impact that they have on the rule of law. The research was conducted through observing trials and interviewing judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers, NGO lawyers, petitioners, the accused, and victims.
The research revealed two significant nuances in the reasons for compromises that have significant policy implications. The first is that the victims do not always file cases they intend to compromise out of spite, but rather use the strength of the Act in a desperate attempt to compel a scorned lover to take responsibility for his financial obligations. While the practice serves an essential social function, its value is reduced by the legal ban on human rights based mediators who could assist the parties in reaching a just and sustainable solution. As a result, some women agree to return to an abusive husband or marry their rapist out of belief it will offer financial security. The second is that a judge may also compel parties to settle, especially if s/he believes the victim is financially destitute. This has many negative consequences, including widening the equality divide between rich and poor, increasing men’s vulnerability to extortion through false accusations, and eroding the deterrent power of the Act.
This paper demonstrates how inadequate social services and limited opportunities for women in Bangladesh, particularly those who are survivors of violent crime, have resulted in unregulated adaptations to the Act that are eclipsing its intended purpose.