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# (dis)LOCATING THE CHITTAGONG HILLTRACTS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF BANGLADESH

Farida C. Khan

## ABSTRACT

Bangladesh is one of the most densely populated nations in the world. It is also among the poorest, struggling for decades to break out of poverty. In the articulation of development policies, the government has favored an industry-led modernizing approach, hoping to "take off" to a high rate of economic growth. During the formulation of these policies, however, scant attention is paid to sustainable development and environmental issues. The Chittagong Hilltracts is an area of the country that exemplifies a lack of local participation in the national development agenda formulated in collaboration with international donor agencies. This paper examines various aspects of this absence of a broad-based development policy and notes that it has led to environmental degradation and a failure to take account of indigenous groups in the determination of social welfare. Policies implemented with a narrow notion of development as an objective have undermined alternative development paths that could have been followed in the Chittagong Hilltracts. The process through which this has occurred is examined over time. It is suggested that a participatory and more regionally-balanced approach to development may be more sustainable and firmly root democracy in the long run.

### Introduction

Development policies espoused by most social scientists in the 1950s and 60s were based on narrowly framed ideas emphasizing industrial growth and modernization. More recently, these ideas have been critiqued as failing to take into account particularities of local and indigenous populations and for causing environmental degradation and damage. These earlier policies dictated single, uniform visions of economic growth for most of the developing world and are now often labeled "unsustainable". In fact, sustainable development has become a common term and is used as part of everyday discourse among non-governmental organizations and policymakers. What the term actually refers to may vary somewhat: – McLaren and Bosworth (1994), Norton and Toman (1997), Carruthers (2001), Harrison (2000), Doeleman and Sandler (1998), and Stafanovich (2000) all vary in their theoretical construction of the term or their account regarding its origin. What there seems to be broad agreement on, however, is that sustainable development requires local political participation and consensus building as opposed to autocratic directives about economic policy.<sup>1</sup> Some key ingredients of this approach are preservation of traditional cultural habits and the environment.<sup>2</sup>

This paper addresses these issues in the context of the Southeastern region of Bangladesh – the Chittagong Hilltracts. It is shown how a top-down national development policy largely ignored the culture and environment of indigenous groups in this area from the 1960s to the turn of the millennium. While the

contradiction between regional and national development could have been examined by choosing any area of Bangladesh, it is especially clear in the case of the Hilltracts as large numbers of the indigenous population, who are ethnically and culturally different from the Bengali-speaking natives of most of the country, inhabit the lush, green hills of this area.

The first section of the paper examines how the development agenda was formulated by bureaucrats and international organizations for Bangladesh; the next section traces how the specific application of this agenda to the Chittagong Hilltracts led to conflict and violence; the third touches on the Peace Process attempted by the national government, its provisions and shortcomings; finally, the last section describes the current condition in the Hilltracts and concludes that without local consensus and participation, these problems will worsen and that the government will not be able to articulate and implement a development policy which can be welfare-enhancing for the peoples of the Hilltracts and, hence, for the nation as a whole.

### The Development Agenda in Bangladesh

Development efforts in Bangladesh, one of the poorest regions in South Asia, are designed with a view to break out of the grip of what developmentalists have called "the vicious cycle of poverty."<sup>3</sup> Industrial development has long been at the forefront as it has held the promise of growth, exports and employment in modern enterprises. There has been general hope among those who

influence and make economic policy that industrial development allow Bangladesh to most rapidly approximate conditions prevailing in a modern, developed nation.

Rural development continues to account for a significant portion of the total funds devoted to the development budget of the government.<sup>4</sup> This is primarily because the population in the rural areas continues to be 80% of the total, despite the high migration into the urban center of Dhaka, as well as Chittagong and Khulna. Also, despite the aspiration for industrialization, much of the growth in the economy comes from rural activity, especially rice production.

The balance of payment constraint is another reason for emphasizing the industrial or manufacturing sector in government economic policy.<sup>5</sup> Ready-made garments have been a major source of export earnings for the last two decades. Except for a few small sundry manufactures, most exports are agriculture-based and the need to develop a diverse industrial export base is thought to be crucial. This is no different for any other least developed country that must compete in a world market in which trade liberalization has been primarily in manufactured goods and services, and the relative prices of these have been rising for decades.

In keeping with global trends, Bangladesh, too, has moved from an emphasis on large public sector enterprises to export-oriented production financed with both foreign and domestic capital. Export processing zones in Chittagong, Savar, and other areas are expanding. Privatization of state-owned enterprises is now the top priority of the government.<sup>6</sup> Foreign investment in natural gas, power, and infrastructure is also expected to spur industrial development.

Although the recently constructed Jamuna Bridge is designed to reduce the disparity in development between the eastern and the western halves of the country by providing power and communication in the regions to the west of the Jamuna river, most of the industrial projects are located in or around Dhaka, Chittagong, and Khulna.

The history of development policy in the country has been to render infrastructure, communication, and transportation growth subservient to the needs of industrialization and urban-based modernization. As recently as 1999, the budget speech given by the Finance Minister stated, "The acceleration of private investment is one of the (main) objectives of the

government" and that "through its widespread extension in rural areas, electrification will be the basis of economic development and modernization." He then went on to describe the increase in electricity generation capacity and distribution. This is followed by a self-satisfied report on foreign investment in natural gas, telecommunication, and the expensive Jamuna Bridge on which roads and railway lines are to be built. A similar bridge is to be built on another large river, the Padma river. Predictably, the emphasis for rural areas is on flood control and food production and distribution. Proportionately, in 1999, very little is allocated for rural infrastructure which is Tk 1233.25 crore (Tk. 12.33 billion) - about the same as the amount of credit to be disbursed by public sector banks for industrial development loans.<sup>7</sup>

Given that the largest sources of external assistance are The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, assessment of the economic performance and plans for Bangladesh by these donor organization are at least as important as that of the government's. They also tend to be very similar, the donors and the government being married in a comfortable symbiosis. In the World Bank's 1995 Country Economic Memorandum on Bangladesh, accelerated reform towards private sector development was hailed as one of the markers of progress towards *economic growth*.<sup>8</sup> The agenda echoes that of the Finance Minister. It is one of growth based on the export of manufactures. Progress is called for in the area of tariff rationalization to encourage imports and in financial reform and privatization to spur the expansion of private industry, particularly manufactured industrial goods. Although agriculture, education, and health are mentioned, these are not considered the primary sources of economic growth and therefore remain secondary concerns from the main issues discussed at the beginning of this and other such documents.

For years, the rhetoric of development has not emphasized sustainable use of resources or environmental preservation. It was understood that incorporating modern technology in agriculture, rapid industrialization, and greater urbanization would allow Bangladesh to "take off" and grow into an economy that Bangladeshis could be proud of.<sup>9</sup> Modernization discourses about economic development continued to prevail in which industrialization, natural resource extraction, and increased production and productivity at all costs were extolled. This was reflected in economic policy, which put all considerations of issues of resource sustainability and regional equity aside. The result was massive environmental pollution of water,

destruction of biodiversity, and unsustainable urbanization with the population flocking to urban centers, especially Dhaka. One particular problem resulting from such a policy stance was displacement of hill peoples in Chittagong from their traditional lands, agriculture, and habits. The next section addresses this problem.<sup>10</sup>

### Development and Conflict in the Chittagong Hilltracts

An Ecotourism promotion from Bangladesh reads:

“Situated in the far south-eastern corner of Bangladesh, bordering Myanmar (Burma) the Chittagong Hilltracts (CHT) cover three distinct districts of Khagrachari, Rangamati and Bandarban. These are home to about a half a million indigenous peoples of 14 unique tribes. It's quite a relief from the flat lowlands of Bengal - vastly different both in culture and topography. Much of the traditional life-style is still preserved - tribal kings, village headmen and self-sustaining crafts, a natural life-style, all in a rich, still pristine foothill ecological environment. This region has only recently become accessible with the signing of an internationally acclaimed accord between the indigenous people and the government. As the few local hotel registers will confirm, only a handful of foreign tourists have yet had the fortune to visit the Chittagong Hilltracts, truly an experience to treasure.”<sup>11</sup>

This area is home to the *Chakma, Marma, Lushai, Tripura, Bawm, Mru* and many others who are commonly referred to as hill people or *Pahari*. The Paharis constitute a small portion of the population of Bangladesh – about 2.5%. They are ethnically different and have cultures, languages and religions which are different from the bulk of the population. The common method of swidden or *Jum* cultivation used by them have led to their being referred to as *Jummas*. This kind of cultivation involves clearing the land, planting and harvesting, and then leaving the land fallow for a long period (7-10 years on average) before repeating the process. Although plough cultivation, which is practiced in the remainder of Bangladesh, was taken up in the 1920s, large sections of the Paharis did not become plough cultivators primarily because the hillside terrain was too rugged to allow comfortable absorption of the population into this occupation. The Paharis continued to rely on swidden cultivation and live their traditional lifestyles. As the remainder of the country continued with its development plans, electric power became a constraint. In 1951, a dam site was selected on the river Karnaphuli in

Chittagong by the Government of Pakistan. With financial and technical assistance from the US government, the dam was constructed and the first unit of the Karnaphuli hydroelectric power station began its operation in 1962. It is still the sole hydroelectric power source in Bangladesh with installed capacity of 230 MW. The Kaptai lake, which is a reservoir of 1,400 kilometers, was created, displacing about an estimated 70,000 to 90,000 Paharis, mostly Chakmas.<sup>12</sup> This was one of the early cases of development projects that caused forced displacement in South Asia. Today, only 3.4% of the power generation is from hydroelectricity with natural gas being the primary source.<sup>13</sup> Seventy six percent of power is used for domestic purposes, mostly in urban areas. Hence, the Karnaphuli plant and the Kaptai lake have provided little benefits for the hill people. For instance, the Karnaphuli plant does not yet provide electricity to most of the settlements inhabited by the Paharis. On the other hand, the area of ploughlands lost under the reservoir accounted for 54,000 acres or two-fifths of the ploughlands of the region.<sup>14</sup> The people displaced received little compensation, mostly in the form of inferior land that amounted to a third of the land lost.<sup>15</sup> The Kaptai dam continues to flood paddy lands in the upper reaches of the Karnaphuli river and its tributaries each monsoon.<sup>16</sup> About half of the displaced people took refuge in neighbouring India. These refugees were settled in Arunachal Pradesh, Tripura, and other Indian states.

The dam and power plant was envisioned to pave the way for industrial development in the urban areas with almost no heed to the plight of the displaced people. The project was not taken up with the intent of having balanced regional growth; rather it accentuated the polarities between urban and rural areas, as well as the differences between Bengalis and the “ethnic” Paharis. During this time, immigration of Bengali farmers, ethnically different from the Paharis, also began.

When Bangladesh became an independent nation in 1971, the notion of a mono-ethnic state did not include the concept of cultural diversity in Bangladesh. While the Paharis had originally hoped that an independent Bangladesh would enhance their self-determination, this was not so and, in the newly formed state, the Paharis, like other non-Bengalis, were marginalized from the political sphere.

In 1976, The Chittagong Hilltracts Development Board (CHTDB) was formed with a view to “boost the socio-economic uplift of the region” by declaring it a “special economic zone.” The military

government at that time created a special president-led Cabinet Committee for the Hilltracts and the military closely supervised the development program. The first five-year CHTDB plan was funded through foreign aid and, as claimed by the JSS,<sup>17</sup> about 80% of it was spent on infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, electricity, and telecommunications that were designed to benefit the Bangladesh Defence Forces (BDF).<sup>18</sup> The CHTDB plan was formulated and financed with the assistance of various international agencies such as the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA), Asian Development Bank, and Australian Development Assistance Bureau

In the early 1970s, Bengali settlers made up about 11% of the total population of the Hilltracts.<sup>19</sup> By 1981, they were 41%, and by 1991, almost 49%.<sup>20</sup> This rapid encroachment on tribal lands by Bengalis was backed by the military and done under the argument that the hills were lying idle and uncultivated so that additional hands should be exported there in the interest of national productivity and development.<sup>21</sup> New migrants were brought under army protection, leading to a further exodus of the Paharis to Tripura in India.<sup>22</sup> Most of these migrants were settled in valley areas inhabited by indigenous peoples. They were given identity cards, food rations, cattle, roof tins, and title deeds to land, each family being allotted 5 acres of hillside land, 2.5 acres of paddy land, and 4 acres of 'mixed' land.<sup>23</sup> This exceeded the average holdings of the hill people themselves and provided ample incentive for the migrants to move in.

The combination of in-migration and military presence led to the creation of the *Shanti Bahini* (peacekeeping forces), an armed group composed of various Paharis, mostly Chakma. This led to what has been dubbed outright war or genocide during the 1980s and 1990s.<sup>24</sup>

While the development plan provided for various educational and health projects, rehabilitation of landless tribal peasants, reserved seats in higher educational institutions, and had clauses which would favor tribal contractors,<sup>25</sup> various accounts run against the plausibility that much of this was implemented. For instance one account says that Bengalis owned the best agricultural land, held the top administrative, commercial, and business positions, and that all shops in the markets were run by Bengali businessmen, and traders from other areas of Bangladesh. Not a single Pahari was found to own or run a shop in the markets.<sup>26</sup> Also an eyewitness account by a Western national revealed that

"There is a hidden understanding among the Bengali businessmen that they will not buy vegetables, fruits, etc. from the tribals above a certain fixed value, which is much lower than the market price. One day at Bandarban bazaar, ginger was sold to a shop by tribals for 5 takas per mound (82 lbs.) when the actual market price was 5 takas per seer (2 lbs.). I went to the bazaar myself and found that a tribal woman sold 100 lemons to a Bengali wholesale buyer for 20 takas. After five minutes the Bengali wholesale buyer sold these lemons for 75 takas to another Bengali businessman who came from Chittagong. Tribal people can only sell their vegetables to local Bengali businessmen. The businessmen who come from outside Bandarban cannot buy vegetables directly from the tribals."<sup>27</sup> This form of conflict, colonization, and exchanges between the army and the *Shanti Bahini* continued through the 1980s and 1990s until a truce was finally established in December, 1997 through the signing of a treaty by the Prime Minister's office and the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity (PCJSS), a representative of various tribal groups in the Hilltracts.

#### The Peace Accords and Development in the Hilltracts

The Peace Treaty created new institutions to administer affairs in the Hilltracts. These included a Ministry of Chittagong Hilltracts Affairs headed by a minister of tribal background along with a Regional Council which would direct and supervise development activities in this region. The Chittagong Hilltracts Development Board (CHTDB) was to discharge all its responsibilities under the general and overall supervision of the Regional Council.<sup>28</sup> A District Council and a Land Commission were also created for land management, environmental protection and development, tourism, and other legal functions.<sup>29</sup>

With the Chittagong Hilltracts Accord of 1997 in place, the government chalked out a development plan for five years with a budget of \$440 million to develop health, education, infrastructure, and industry in the area. At the same time, the government expected to extract minerals, develop agro-industry, tourism, and exploit the timber and forest resources of the Hilltracts for the mutual benefit of all citizens. Under the treaty, Pahari interests and goals were defined through the Regional Council and the three District Councils.

However, there are several concerns that have not been resolved or have arisen since the treaty. In

September 1998, the government announced the formation of the interim Regional Council with Jyotindra Bodhipriya Larma, also known as Shantu Larma, as its Chairman. Shantu Larma refused to accept this position saying that three names put forward by the PCJSS for positions in the Council had been replaced by partisans of the ruling party, the Awami League.<sup>30</sup> Despite several meetings between the Prime Minister and Shantu Larma, the implementation of an appropriate governance structure has remained a controversial matter.

The rehabilitation of displaced persons was a significant element of the accord although most of the refugees returned from Tripura in India, it is unclear how much of the rehabilitation has reached both tribals and Bengalis displaced by the Kaptai dam. Land disputes remain a common problem. Bengali settlers usually have proper documentation on land ownership but tribals do not. Tribals have difficulty making claims on and selling land if they wish to.<sup>31</sup>

While development allocations for the region have increased, social relations in the area have not improved, with the possibility of violent conflict being ever-present. Spurts of violence among Bengali settlers, the army, and tribals are reported frequently.<sup>32</sup> For years arms flowed into this area because of the war between the Bangladeshi army and Shanti Bahini. The provisions of the treaty were that these arms were to be surrendered and the army presence would be reduced. However, there was no time frame given for the withdrawal of the army and while it is slowly being withdrawn, the police force in the area is strengthening. Sufficient arms still remain so that periodic clashes and injuries have been reported for the past four years. In 1999, the Daily Star noted that violence had claimed forty lives in the two years after the treaty. There had also been 45 cases of abduction. The reported figures suggest that it is mostly tribals who are killed in the fighting. In 2001, the Hill Women's Federation reported continued army repression and rape in the area.<sup>33</sup>

Also, concern remains among the tribals as to the implementation of the accord and the delegation of resource management to the District Councils. Potentially large reserves of natural gas and petroleum exist in the Hilltracts, the extraction of which may begin soon. There is no transparent arrangement as to how the royalties from such activities will be shared.<sup>34</sup> The government is worried that extraction may be hampered amidst the continuing ethnic strife. Blocks 22, 15, and 16 of the natural gas and oil production sharing contracts fall

in parts of the Hilltracts and remain to be exploited as yet.

Another important issue regarding regional development in the Hilltracts is related to natural resource management. The Chittagong Hilltracts is home to one of the largest reserve forest areas in Bangladesh. The annual deforestation in the country is 3.3 percent, one of the highest in South Asia. Many reserve forests have been adversely affected by intensive *Jum* cultivation carried out by tribals who were displaced by the Kaptai dam. In addition, large areas have been affected by in-migration of landless peasants and by logging gangs. Logging operations under sanction of the Bangladesh Forest Industries Development Corporation (BFIDC) have aggravated the situation. The government is reportedly amending forestry laws to deregulate logging so as to allow rapid extraction of timber and other products from the forests. Illegal loggers have also stepped up their activities. Saw mills have reportedly come up since 1999, with trucks carrying timber to the traders and the mills. Tribesmen and settlers carry logs and firewood on their backs to these trucks, receiving nominal prices for their loads. Teak and rain trees are particularly high in demand and thousands of cubic feet of timber are reportedly finding their way to different parts of the country. The Forestry Master Plan of 1993 recommends that government logging operations in the natural forests should continue until 2023. This would lead to a virtual disappearance of the natural forests.<sup>35</sup> The rate at which the natural forests are being converted to teak, pulpwood, or rubber plantations has also increased. Much of this is done with funds from international donors such as the Asian Development Bank.<sup>36</sup> Consequences include destruction of bio-diversity, soil erosion and air pollution.

### Democracy and Development

Several non-governmental agencies have started micro-credit programs in the region in order to help alleviate poverty. There is some skepticism about these activities as a cash economy is not prevalent in some parts of the Hilltracts and it is not certain whether economic activities there can evolve into a cash economy in a sustainable manner. Without requisite marketing and the ability to generate cash with certainty, many tribals who live near poverty may become trapped in indebtedness.

The signing of gas contracts and extraction are upcoming issues as well. If the regional government does not have adequate participation, benefits from mining will go to large foreign companies and

government officials rather than to the local population. Mining involves environmental hazards and may not receive the ready endorsement of the Regional Council and local representatives. The same local government did not approve the list of voters provided in the election of 2001 but the central government paid no attention to these objections and went ahead with election procedures. It is not certain whether participatory democracy is fully functional in the current situation.

Meanwhile soil erosion, private logging, and unplanned urbanization in the area remain problems that can only worsen. Simply flooding the Hilltracts with development activities that are models for other areas in Bangladesh is not a solution for this region. Both the geography and the life habits of the hills are very different from the rest of the country so that a new understanding of sustainable development that preserves the forests and the cultures needs to be employed. Suggestions have been made to produce cash crops such as tobacco or introduce dairy farming in the area. These ideas continue to be introduced by those with a modernization agenda, not realizing that these would displace traditional ways of producing food-grains and vegetables and boar-raising common to the hills.<sup>37</sup>

Prior to the Peace Treaty, development activities in the region were carried out under the direct supervision of the army without participation of the hill people. With greater entrenchment of political and democratic processes within Bangladesh, it is more appropriate to have development activities based on participation, civil society, and dialogue. Amartya Sen says that political freedom, economic facilities, social facilities, and transparency guarantees constitute instrumental freedoms that are the means and end to development themselves.<sup>38</sup> If the natives of a region do not have any say in how they wish the development projects to be handed down to them from a central or external governing body, this speaks of a lack of participation in policy making. It is inconsistent with Sen's notion of development even if it is consistent with an increase in income per capita. Sustainable and participatory development involves more guarantees for people than increases in monetary incomes alone. Given the particular features of the Hilltracts, it is an ideal location for the government to set an example of participatory development by involving a diverse constituency of multiple ethnic and religious backgrounds.

After years of military rule, democracy in Bangladesh is at its infancy. This fledgling

democracy has recently been pressured by the US government to export natural gas. The World Bank and IMF have also imposed the condition that it must carry out the privatization targets initially projected. The government must already cope with poverty, natural disasters, and a rising debt burden and therefore has no choice but to be attentive to the various external pressures. On the other hand, democracy itself can survive only if it is sufficiently inclusive and responsive to the needs of all constituents. All people in Bangladesh must believe that they have a stake in the nation. This means that literacy, health, and the other basic needs have to be a priority and are best determined and distributed through local cooperation. Simply setting a development agenda of industrialization and commercialization that responds passively to global changes will not allow a self-determined and sustainable form of development in Bangladesh. It will, instead, breed inequality and lead to segregation, communalism, and violence. An ethical conception of development involves the participation of a large rural population and marginalized and minority populations. In a largely homogenous nation it is the only way to ensure that democracy will endure. Furthering the political processes through which this is done would constitute lasting development. It is therefore suggested that local (and hence national) economic policy be formulated with far greater attention to a participatory process and with environmental sustainability as the vision.

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## ENDNOTES

1. See Prugh, Costanza, and Daly (2000) or Lyon, Smuts, and Steven (2001) for a fuller articulation of these ideas.
2. Kofi Annan's March 2001 address in Bangladesh has the following passages "Unsustainable practices are woven deeply into the fabric of modern life" and "Billions of dollars perpetuate practices in farming, transport, and energy use that make it harder for the environment to provide the life-sustaining services on which we depend".
3. Per capita income is at \$370 in 1999 and other quality of life indices are commensurately dismal (World Development Report, 2001, tables).
4. The development budget itself is 45% of total expenditure in 1999-2000.
5. The current account deficit increased from \$160 million in July-November 1999 to \$334 million in July-November 2000 as noted in the World Bank Periodic Economic Update, 2001, p 3 Also, 49.5% of the money spent on the government's Annual Development Program for 1999-2000 comes from foreign aid.
6. Admittedly the process has been slow, as in most developing countries, due to bureaucratic incompetence and political processes.
7. Ministry of Finance, Budget Speech, 1999.
8. Underline from the original document, *Bangladesh: Recent Economic Developments and Priority Reform Agenda for Rapid Growth*, February, 1995, The World Bank.
9. Most of the economic growth and development literature in the 1950s through the 1970s assumed this. See Roy (1988), The World Bank (1995b), and Yusuf and Kumar (1996) for more recent reaffirmations of this thesis.
10. More recent documents on Bangladesh put out by The World Bank incorporate considerations

of education and health as well as environmental protection and managed urbanization. In fact the "Vision for 2020" includes these as goals along with high economic growth and significant competitive diversification into global markets (World Bank, 2000). However, despite the acknowledgment of these issues, government policy has not significantly deviated from its earlier obsession with industrialization and urbanization as objectives. Another document, "The World Bank and Bangladesh: Building Better Lives," also addresses food security, micro-credit, and education for girls and advocates the building of partnerships through NGOs and a greater building of civil society. Despite the use of such rhetoric which international donors are now compelled to employ at the heels of widespread global activism and dissent, the two major goals with respect to economic policy remain public sector reform and extraction of natural gas.

11. WORLDVIEW- Bangladesh Ecotour Guide in <http://www/geocities.com/TheTropics/Resort/1275>.
12. See McMully, P., 1999, "After the Deluge: The Urgent Need For Reparations for Dam Victims" in *Cultural Survival Quarterly*, 10-31, 1999, p 33-38, Zaman, 1996, "Development and Displacement in Bangladesh; towards a resettlement policy" in *Asian Survey*, Vol 36, No 7, 691-704, or Sopher, David, 1963, "Population Dislocation in the Hilltracts" in *Geographical Review*, Vol. 53. No 3, 337-62.
13. Statistics of Electricity, <http://shakti.hypermart.net/statistics/electricity.htm>.
14. Roy, R.D., "Land Rights of the Indigenous Peoples of the Chittagong Hilltracts" in *Land, Association for Land Reform and Development, Dhaka*.
15. Ibid.
16. Roy, R.D. 1996, "Colonization, Marginalization, and Disempowerment of Indigenous People in the Chittagong Hilltracts, Bangladesh: Will there be a reversal of the trend?" paper presented at the Conference on Bangladesh: Peoples' Struggles in Montreal, Canada.
17. The JSS is the acronym used for the Parbottya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samiti, a peoples' solidarity association mostly composed of Chakmas.
18. Levene, Mark, 1999, "The Chittagong Hilltracts: a case study in the political economy of 'creeping' genocide", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol 20, Issue 2 339-70
19. Ibid
20. Surhawardy, B.H., 1995, "Outline of the CHT Economy: An Analysis" in Tripura, Arunendu, et al., eds., *Vision, Rangamati*.
21. As recently as 1991, the average population density in the Hilltracts is 80/km<sup>2</sup> as compared to the national average of 750/km.
22. Schendel, W.V., 1994, "The Invention of the 'Jummas': State Formation and Ethnicity in Southeastern Bangladesh" in Bandyopadhyay, S. et al., eds., *Bengal: Communities, Development, and States*, Manohar, New Delhi.
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24. Mey, W., "Genocide in the Chittagong Hilltracts, Bangladesh" published by International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), Copenhagen, 1984 or Neitschmann, B., "Economic Development by Invasion of Indigenous Nations", *Cultural Survival Quarterly*, Vol 10, No 2, 1986.
25. Shelley, M. R., 1992, *The Chittagong Hilltracts of Bangladesh: The Untold Story*, Centre for Development Research, Bangladesh.
26. Zaman, M.Q., 1980, Seminar held at the University of Rajshahi, Bangladesh, March, 1980.
27. "The Chittagong Hilltracts, Militarization, Oppression, and the Hill Tribes", Anti-Slavery Society, Indigenous Peoples and Development Series, Report No. 2 – 1984. London.
28. Chittagong Hilltracts Treaty, 1997

29. Rashiduzzaman, M., 1998, "Bangladesh's Chittagong Hilltracts Peace Accord: Institutional Features and Strategic Concerns", *Asian Survey*, Vol. 38, No. 7, 653-70.
30. Daily Star, August 4, 2000, "Dialogue on 'Peace Building in the Chittagong Hilltracts'".
31. Ibid.
32. Daily Star, August 22, 1999, "Dighinala tense: Eleven more hurt in clashes" and Daily Star, October 17, 1999, "Dighinala clash: 3 killed, condition of 5 critical".
33. Bangladesh Human Rights network, 2001.
34. Draft of Speeches by Rupayan Dewan and Raja Devashish Roy at the 17<sup>th</sup> Session of the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations Geneva, 26-30 July, 1999.
35. Gain, P and Roy, R D., 1999, "Indigenous peoples and forests in Bangladesh", in *Forests and Indigenous Peoples of Asia*, Minority Rights Group Report 98/4.
36. Current development projects envisioned by the ADB acknowledge that for the last two decades civil strife has rendered the region's condition to destitution. Per capita income is found to be 40 percent lower than the national average. Another article by Quadir, et al (1999) indicates that while population density is low in the Hilltracts, measures such as calorie intake, income or expenditure show that substantial poverty prevails in the region.
37. Daily Star, August 4, 2000.
38. Sen, 1999. p 38.

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